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Abstract 
This thesis studies the access pricing issues in wireless network competition. 
Access price is a critical issue in network competition as the operator is selling 
her own resources (profit-making) to her competitor (profit-losing). Mobile-
to-mobile (MTM) access pricing has been adopted by many countries such 
as Japan, Italy, and Kenya. In this thesis, we study the interaction between 
user price and access price in both regulated and deregulated market. In a 
regulated market, the regulator set the social optimal user price to achieve 
social optimality. On the other hand, in a deregulated market, we model the 
market by a Stackelberg game assuming each operators sets a user price and 
access price to maximize her own profit. 
We adopt the model proposed by [8] and enrich it with wireless properties. 
Three market models are considered - fixed coverage wireless market model 
where user-network association is fixed, full coverage wireless market model 
where each networks has full coverage, and three base stations full coverage 
wireless market model where one of the operator builds a new base station. We 
compare the social welfare obtained in the regulated market and the operator's 
profit in the deregulated market. We show that in full coverage model (both 
in two base stations model and three base stations model), when difference 
between the two operators' per unit bandwidth costs is large, the society will 
be better off if only the lower cost operator serves the market. Also, no matter 
in two base stations or three base stations case, providing full coverage does 
not always improve the social welfare. In building one more base station, the 
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overall social welfare is improved only when the operator's per bandwidth cost 
is lower compared to the rival networks. In a deregulated market, full coverage 
does not always result in higher profits. Building one more base station does 
not always result in higher operator's profit either. In the full coverage (both 
in two base stations model and three base stations model), a higher per unit 
bandwidth cost operator will lose market when the difference between the per 
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1.1 Motivation and Overview 
Due to the rapid growth of wireless services development, it is important to 
understand how to fairly allocate valuable wireless resources. Researchers have 
been analysing the problem using prices. This line of work tries to set a proper 
price by using techniques developed from optimization(e.g., [1] and [2])，game 
theory (e.g.,[3] and [4]) or auction theory (e.g.,[5]). Our work falls into the 
second category. Several issues have been considered in this line of studies: 
Network Externalities, Network Effect, and Interconnection. For this thesis, 
we look at the interconnection issues in wireless competition. 
Interconnection happens when an operator needs access to resources owned 
by the other network. Inter-network communications bring benefits to all net-
works involves, as a network does not necessarily need to build an infrastruc-
ture covering the entire market. In telecommunications, interconnection could 
happen between fixed-to-fixed, fixed-to-mobile, and mobile-to-mobile network. 
Serving users from other networks brings negative impacts on a network's own 
available resource. This raises the notion of interconnection fee or access pric-
ing, which is the settlement between networks in consuming resources pro-
vided by the other networks. Access pricing is more complex in nature than 
user pricing since it is selling the resources (profit-gaining) to a competitor 
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(profit-losing). 
Access pricing has long been a practice in long-distance calls between coun-
tries. It has also been the practice between mobile operators such as in Japan, 
Germany, Italy [6] and in Africa. As the wireless traffic is becoming more 
data-drive, it is expected that access pricing would become a more common 
issues between mobile operators. 
In real life practices, operators usually are given the flexibility to negotiate 
with each other to set the access pricing. Regulators will take intervention in 
cases of disputes or inefficiency. This happens in long distance call in US [7 
and recently between mobile operators in South Africa in 2010. 
Access pricing does not only apply to telecommunication networks. In fact, 
it was first studied in electricity and transportation as well. Access pricing has 
been considered in two network structures - one way or two way networks. One 
way network involves vertically related firms at which the downstream firm 
needs access to the upstream firm while two way networks involves vertically 
unbundled firms at which each firm needs access to each other. 
Traditionally, the literature analyzes on how to regulate access pricing. The 
need for regulation in a one-way network is particularly crucial. In a one-way 
network, there is a monopoly upstream firm (the incumbent) that upholds the 
resource needed by the downstream firm (the new entrant). The incumbent 
will set access charges as high as possible to make further entry difficult, but 
not vice versa. The new entry concern in one-way access is not so severe in 
two-way access since both networks need access from each other. However, 
this does not mean regulation is unnecessary in two-way access. Problems 
such as operators collude to set high access pricing still arise. Approaches 
such as Ramsey access pricing (e.g.,[8],[9]), the efficient component-pricing 
rule (ECPR) (e.g.,[10],[11],[12]), cost-based access prices (e.g.,[13]) has been 
largely studied in the literature. 
Our work fills in the gap between the existing studies on wireless network 
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competitions and network access pricing. Existing studies on network access 
prices considered either a traditional wireline network [9] or a hybrid market of 
a wireline telephone network and a wireless cellular network [14]. References 
15], [16] studied how to determine the access pricing among hierarchical Inter-
net Service Providers with a specific traffic model. None of the above results 
captured the impacts of channel conditions and transmission power. Existing 
work on wireless network competition (e.g., [17],[18],[19],[20]) did not consider 
access prices between operators. 
Also, traditional access pricing models did not take into account the fact 
that resources demand from downstream and upstream traffic is different in a 
wireless environment. Existing literature on telecommunication access pricing, 
even to a cellular network (e.g.,[14])), considers the cost in a per-call basis. Yet, 
the resources demanded from traffic terminating at users close to his own base-
station could be very different to the traffic ending at user far away from his 
base-station. The location of the originating and terminating users do matter 
in this aspect. 
This thesis focuses on the interaction between access pricing and user pric-
ing, and how they are set in both a regulated and deregulated scenario. We are 
interested in understanding if a fixed coverage scenario could provide a better 
social welfare and profits than a full coverage scenario. Also, does investing in 
setting up a new base station help increasing the social welfare and profit? 
In a regulated scenario, regulators such as the government could control 
the social welfare by means of user pricing. We showed also that regulators do 
not have to always control the user pricing directly. Setting the right access 
pricing could also achieve the same goal. On the other hand, in a deregulated 
scenario, the selfish operators will set the user pricing and access pricing to 
maximize his/her own profits. 
This thesis considers three different market models - fixed coverage model, 
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full coverage model, and full coverage three base stations model. Fixed cover-
age model considers the scenario where the network-user association is fixed. 
This happens in real life such as in country side where certain area is covered 
by only one operator but not the other. Full coverage model considers the 
scenario where operators provide full coverage and each user choose his/her 
own service providers. The full coverage three base stations model models the 
situation where an operator invest in building up a new base station under the 
full coverage scenario. 
In each of these three market models, we formulate the social welfare and 
each operator's profit in regulated and deregulated scenario respectively. Then, 
we compare the social welfare and profits achieved in each of these cases. By 
numerical study, we showed that: 
Full coverage market model could result in a better social welfare and 
profits than in full coverage market model. However, it is not always the case. 
Investing in setting up a new base station could improve social welfare when 
the per bandwidth cost is low. As the cost increases, social welfare is even 
worse by setting up a new base station. 
Profit is not always improved in the full coverage scenario compared to the 
fixed coverage. Investing in setting up a new base station could improve profits. 
Also, it helps relieving the effect brought about when the per bandwidth cost 
increases so that the operator will lose market at a larger cost. 
1.2 Thesis Outline 
This thesis is organized in six chapters. In Chapter 2, we describe the models 
that will be used in the analysis. Specifically, we present the wireless market 
model, network's cost structure and users' payoff function. In Chapter 3, we 
propose the fixed market model at which network-users association is fixed. 
Also, we formulate the social welfare and profit of each operators. We show 
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how the regulator should control the user pricing or access pricing to achieve 
social optimality. We also formulate a deregulated market by a Stackelberg 
game. We show how each operator will set the user pricing and access pricing 
accordingly to maximize her own profitin the deregulated environment. 
In Chapter 4，we propose the full market model at which each user chooses 
his/her own service provider. We will study how each user chooses his/her 
own operator. Similar as in Chapter 3, we formulate the social welfare and 
each operator's profit function so as to solve for the social optimal user pricing, 
profit-maximizing user pricing and profit-maximizing access pricing. The so-
cial optimal case, or the equilibrium case could be one of the three cases: Only 
network 1 in the market, only network 2 in the market, or both network 1 and 
network 2 in the market. We show the corresponding social optimal case or 
equilibrium case under different cost structure, and compare the social welfare 
obtained in regulated market and operator's profit in deregulated market to 
the fixed wireless market. 
In Chapter 5, we present the three base stations model which models one of 
the operators builds up a new base station. Similar as before, we will formulate 
the social welfare and each operators' profit and solve for the social optimal 
user pricing, equilibrium user pricing and access pricing. We will compare the 
social welfare obtained in the regulated market, and operator's profits in a 
deregulated market to that of the two base stations model. 





In this section, we will describe the basic wireless market model that we use, 
followed by users' utility function, network costs and the access price. 
2.1 Basic Wireless Market Model 
Our model is the extension to the model first proposed by [8] in 1996. [8 
considers the problem in linear cost and linear access price. It illustrates how 
regulator could control the access price using methods such as Efficient Com-
ponent Pricing Rule (ECPR) in a one-way access problem. Since then, several 
work is built upon this framework (e.g., [21], [22]). We took similar model as 
in this line of work that a one-dimensional market model as in Fig. 2.1 is con-
sidered. It consists of two network operators. The number of users are fixed. 
Users are uniformly located as in [18] along the segment [0,1]. This means 
that users do not move, or users move without changing the user distribution. 
Each network companies could have one base station only as in the figure, or 
more than one in the three base stations market model as described later on. 
As in the Hotelling model, the base stations are placed at the two ends. The 
users' distance to the base stations affects the experienced channel gains of 
users. An operator could build more than one base-stations to serve users. 
This one-dimensional model is a simplification of a three-dimensional or 
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Figure 2.1: An illustration of the wireless market. 
two dimensional scenario [4], which are complicated to analyse. Also, the 
model could be extended to involve multiple networks. In the previous work 
in [23], we talked about the result that could be applied to the case involving 
three networks. 
From the model described in [8], we enrich the model with specific wireless 
components to better model a wireless scenario. The users' different location 
would mean a different channel gain between a user and a base-station. We 
adopt the two-ray wireless model such that the channel gain follows the large-
scale distance based attenuation. Small scale fading does exist but in the long 
term the average attenuation by small scale fading does not matter. To avoid 
having an infinitely large channel gain, the base-stations are eg away from their 
closest users. 
In Fig 2.1，the market is split between operator 1 and operator 2 such 
that users located between [0，m] are served by operator 1 and users located 
between [m, 1] are served by operator 2. The way how the market is split 
between operators is described by the specific wireless market model and will 
be discussed further in the subsequent chapters. 
We consider three wireless market models - fixed coverage model, full cover-
age model and three base-stations full coverage model. We begin our analysis 
with a fixed coverage model at which the base-stations of each operators will 
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cover a fixed amount of users. Such coverage could be a result of geograph-
ical constraints. After that, we will continue our analysis in a full coverage 
model at which both operators could cover all the users and users will have 
the right to choose their service providers. Also, based on the full coverage 
market model, we look three base stations model where one of the operator 
builds one more base-station at the other end to attract users who are not 
currently served by her. 
2.2 User's Utility, Payment, Payoff, and De-
mand 
A one-way data communication session involves a source user and destination 
user. The session is intra-network when both users belong to the same network, 
or inter-network when the two users belong to different networks. We adopt 
the a-fair utility function [24] to represent the quality of service (QoS) of a 
session in terms of its data rate y, 
广 a 
咖 = r ^ ' 
where the utility parameter a G (0,1) [9 . 
If a source user i belonging to network j starts a session with the data rate 
y小 then it pays network j at the user pricing tt^  and hence the user payment is 
Tijyij. The source user i,s payoff (which is also the payoff of the communication 
session) is 
yfa 
nijjij, ^j) = — ^jy^j-
We assume the Calling Party Pays charging scheme [25] such that the desti-
nation node does not need to pay the user pricing. 
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The optimal demand of data rate that maximizes utility is 
綱 = 々 〜 (2.1) 
which has a constant elasticity of 1/a. A small a denotes an elastic application 
and a large a denotes an inelastic application. Source user i,s optimal payoff 
is 
l-l/a TT • i_l 
丄一Q； J 
which only depends on the network price ttj and is independent of the user's 
location. This is desirable in practice, as the user only needs to keep track of 
the total data usage instead of where he conducts the communications. 
2.3 Network Costs 
A communication session involves both a uplink transmission (from the source 
user to its network's base station) and a downlink transmission (from the des-
tination user's base station to the destination user). Each part of the transmis-
sions involves a cost proportional to the bandwidth consumed. For a source 
user i belonging to network j, the relationship between the transmission rate 
Uij and the consumed bandwidth Bij depends on the distance between the user 
and the base station dij, the uplink transmission power per unit bandwidth F^, 
and the background noise density Uq. We assume an Orthogonal Frequency 
Division Multiple Access scheme with equal power allocation, and no two users 
(either in a same or different networks) interfere with each other. Thus 
Vij = Bij log 1 + ——, 
V J 
where hij{dij) is the channel gain depending on the distance dij. One possible 
choice is hij{dij) — where [3 is the channel attenuation factor (usually 
between 2 to 4). The analysis in this paper can be generalized to other distance 
based channel models as we keep the function hij{dij) abstract most of the time. 
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The total bandwidth cost for supporting this uplink transmission is CjBij. The 
cost for the downlink transmission can be computed similarly, except that P让 
will be replaced by P在 and Cj will be replaced by the cost of the corresponding 
network. For notation simplicities, we denote 
咖 三 + ^ ^ ) ， 
桑 ) 三 log 1 + 
V / 
Let us compute the total cost of serving one communication session. If 
source user i subscribes network 1 and is at location di, then network I's cost 
of the uplink transmission is: 
O Vil Vil CiBii = Ci 7 ^ — Ci——-—. 
log 二 ⑷ ) ( 成 ） 
Serving a user close-by (with a small value of di and thus a larger g'^{di)) costs 
less compared with serving a user far away. For the downlink traffic, since 
the destination may be with network 1 or network 2, we need to compute the 
expected downlink cost. In our model, users are uniformly distributed along 
the segment [0,1], and each of them will have equal probability of receiving 
data. The expected cost is Ci J^ •^^dr to network 1 and C2 •^^dr to 
network 2. Hence, the total expected cost to support a session initiated by a 
user i located at di in network 1 with data rate yn is: 
m 1—m 
Vil , f y n � � f Vil . 
0 0 
The first two terms are related to network 1 and the third term is related to 
network 2. 
In the rest of the paper, we denote 
rm 1 rm -i 
三 / — - d r and 三 / -rr-rdr, 
� ) J o g^r) � ) Jo 
which represent the average bandwidth needed to serve one unit of uplink and 
a downlink transmission of a network with a market share m, respectively. 
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Figure 2.2: Illustration of the access pricing. Left: To complete an inter-
network traffic initiated from network 1, network 2 charges network 1 a) per 
unit of bandwidth. Right: the access price ai is defined similarly. 
2.4 Access Price 
For an inter-network session, the network with the destination user cannot 
charge the source user, but bears the cost of the downlink transmission. To 
compensate this additional cost, the destination network charges the source 
network an access pricing. As illustrated in Fig. 2.2, to complete an inter-
network session initiated from network 1, network 1 pays network 2 a] per 




Fixed Coverage Two Base 
Stations Model 
In this chapter, we study the regulated and deregulated market in the fixed 
coverage two base stations model. We first formulate the social welfare and 
solve for the social optimal user pricing in the regulated market. Then, we 
showed that regulators can also achieve social optimality by means of access 
pricing. Finally, we study the deregulated market and solve for the profit-
maximizing access pricing and user pricing. 
3.1 Social Optimal User Pricing 
In a fixed coverage model, we assume that the user-network associations are 
fixed, such that users in [0, m] subscribe to network 1 and users in [m, 1 
subscribe to network 2. This means that network 1 has a market share of 
m, and network 2 has a market share of 1 — m. Reference [26] illustrates 
one such example, where some part of California is covered by AT&T but not 
Verizon (and vice versa). The analysis based on this restrictive assumption of 
fixed market share will help us understand the more general scenario of flexible 
market share. 
A regulator cares about the social welfare, which is the total payoffs of all 
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network entities in the market, i.e., the total user utility minus the total net-
work cost. The payments (either from users to networks or between networks) 
are internal transfers and do not affect the social welfare. However, a regulator 
typically cannot directly control how much resources that users consume. In 
this section, we will look at the case where the regulator maximizes the social 
welfare by controlling the user pricing tti and 7T2.^  
The social welfare 5W(7ri，7T2, m, Ci, C2) is: 
1 - 1 1 - 1 
SW(tti, 71-2, m, ci, C2) =m- h (1 - m)-
1 _ a 1 _ a (3.1) 
_ l 
—TTi "/(m,Ci，C2) - 772 " / ( I — m,C2,Ci), 
where / ( m , Cj, represents the total cost in serving sessions originated 
from network j of a market share m, 
f(m, Cj, c-j) = CjB'^im) + mCjB'^{m) + 卞 - m ) . 
Here c_j denotes the per unit bandwidth cost of the network other than net-
work j . For example, if j = 1, then c_j = C2. 
The regulator's objective is to choose tti and 7T2 to maximize the social 
welfare. From (3.1), it is clear that the social welfare is decoupled between tti 
and 7T2. We can also show that the social welfare is quasi-concave in both tti 
and 兀2, and thus the optimal user prices can be obtained through solving the 
first order conditions. 
Proposition 1 Socially optimal user prices are vrf = / ( m , ci, C2)/m and 7rf = 
/ ( I — m，C2,Ci)/(l - m ) . 
Observation 1 The social optimal user prices do not depend on the utility 
parameter a. 
Proposition 1 works for any channel function. In other words, the social 
optimal user price changes accordingly in different channel gain functions. 
iThe access prices ai and 02 cancel out and do not affect social welfare. 
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Figure 3.1: Social optimal user price yrf of network 1 with different market 
share m and cost Ci. Here hij{dij) = pd = pu =丄,and C2 = 1. 
In fact, since we are abstracting the average bandwidth function and 
the social optimal user price could be applied to wireless model other 
than the two-way propagation model with slight modification to the average 
bandwidth function. 
Also, Proposition 1 suggests that the social optimal user price increases 
as the bandwidth costs for any channel gains. This is intuitive that since 
higher the operating cost, the higher the user prices as a compensation to the 
operators. Figure 3.1 shows a plot of social optimal user price of operator 
1 with respect to a change in the operator I's market share under different 
operating cost Ci. 
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3.2 Social Optimal Access Pricing 
Very often the regulator cannot even control the user pricing in practice. This 
may be due to the complexity of the regulation, or due to the fact that the gov-
ernment just does not want to micro-manage the telecommunication industry. 
However, the regulator can still achieve the social optimality by setting the ac-
cess pricing, which induce the right user pricing set by the profit-maximizing 
operators. 
We can model the system as a three-stage decision process as in Fig 3.2. In 
stage one, the regulator determines the access pricing ai and a � between two 
network operators. In stage two, each network j chooses the user pricing ttj 
to maximize its profit, given ai and <12. Access price is determined first before 
user price since user price changes more frequently than access price. Finally, 
each users determine their rate demand according to the user price announced 
by their own operators. 
We will use backward induction to analyze the three-stage dynamic game 
'27]. We start with Stage III and analyze the users' optimal rate demand 
given the operators' user prices and access prices. Then we look at Stage II 
and analyze how operators make the user pricing decision taking users' rate 
demand into consideration. Finally, at Stage I, we look at how the operators set 
the access price assuming the user price and users' rate demand are determined. 
At Stage III, the users' rate demand is tt^  “ as determined in 2.1. Next, we 
will analyze Stage II of this dynamic game. 
3.2.1 Networks' Profit-Maximizing User Pricing Given 
Fixed Access Prices: 7rt(ai,a2) and 7rg(ai,a2) 
We begin by deriving the network profits. Consider a session originated from 
a user i located at di in network 1. Network I's profit from this session equals 
the payment received from user i minus the total expected cost considering 
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stage I: Regulator determines access prices that each operator 
pays to each other for access 
yi滋： 禪 4赞 
^ 
Stage II: Operators determine user prices charging their customers 
PI 
^ 
Stage III: Each end user determines the data rate demand from 
his/her own operator 
Figure 3.2: Three-stage dynamic game in fixed coverage market model: Reg-
ulator determines the access price. Each operators then determines the user 
price, and finally each user determines his/her data rate demand. 
both the possibility of the intra-network and inter-network sessions, i.e., 
_ J_ m _丄 1—m 
1—1 TTi—s f 7r"" , f 7 
兀 1 " — ciT-r^ — ci / , - \dr - a2 / ,, .dr. 
1 gHdi) J gd(r) J gd{r) 
0 0 
For an inter-network session originating from a user i located at di in net-
work 2，network I's profit equals the access price payment received from net-
work 2 minus the cost in supporting the downlink communication, i.e., 
m ^ 
- Cl) J 為 咖 . 
0 
Combining the above analysis, the profits of network 1 (Ri) and of network 
2 {R2) are 
丑i(7ri,7r2) — mTTi “ — CITT^ - mcin^ " B � m ) 
- m) + (1 - m)(ai - 去B�m) 
and 
丄 _ i 
^2(^1,^2) =(1 - m)7r2 “ - C27r2 - m) 
- ( 1 - m)c27r~^B'^(l - m) - (1 - m)ai7r~^B'^(m) 
+ m(a2 - C 2 ) 7 r � " B � l - m). 
By optimizing Ri over tti and optimizing R2 over 兀2，we have the following 
results. 
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Proposition 2 For any given access prices ai and a] set by the regulator, 
networks 1 and 2 set the following user prices to maximize their individual 
profits, 
* ,、 c們m) + mciB^jm) + 一 m) , ” � 
� , (3.2) 
and 
八、—- m) + (1 - m)c^B\\ _ m) + a^B\m) 
兀2 � = (l-m)(l-a) . ( 叫 
Observation 2 A network f s profit-maximizing user pricing tt; depends on 
the rival network's access pricing a—j and is independent of its own access 
pricing dj. 
Before studying the regulator's optimal choice of access pricing, let us con-
sider the case where no access pricing is set, i.e., ai = a2 = 0. We can compare 
networks' profit maximizing user pricing (tt^  and tt^ ) with the social optimal 
user pricing (yrf and vrf) computed in Section 3.1. 
Observation 3 With ai = a2 = 0, the profit-maximizing user prices ttJ' and 
TTg always lead to a smaller social welfare comparing with the one achieved 
under 7rf and Trf, except for one value of the market share. 
Figure 3.3 shows the social optimal user price Trf (which is independent of 
the utility parameter a as shown in Observation 1) and the profit-maximizing 
user price Trf for three different values of a under different market shares. For 
each choice of a, t^I only intersects with Trf once, and the prices are different for 
all other values of m. For example, when a = 0.2 and market share m < 0.55, 
we have tt^ < Trf and users' demand is larger in the profit-maximizing case 
than in the social optimal case. It is the other way around when m > 0.55. 
Neither case is desirable from the regulator's point of view. 
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Figure 3.3: Social optimal user price 7rf and profit-maximizing user price 
ttI with different values of market share m and utility parameter a. Here 
hij{dij) = pd = pu = 1，and ci = C2 = 1. 
3.2.2 Social Optimal Access Pricing: af and af 
Now consider the stage 1 problem. The regulator can set the proper access 
pricing af and af so that the networks' profit-maximizing behavior is aligned 
with the social optimality objective, i.e., 7ri(af) = Trf and = 7r|. 
By comparing the values of Trf and Trf in Proposition 1 and the values of 
TT^  and TTg in (3.2) and (3.3), we have the following. 
Proposition 3 The social optimal access prices are 
s _ (1 - m)(l - a)7rf - - m) 妒 (1 - m) 
= (1 - m)B^(l - m) ， 
s _ m ( l - a ) 7 r f - C i E ^ ( m ) Ci妒(m) 
= mBd{m) Bd{l-my 
where vrf and Trf are defined in Proposition 1. 
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Figure 3.4: Social optimal access price af with different market share m and 
utility parameter a. Here hij{dij) = pd 二 pu 二 丄,and Ci = C2 = 1. 
Figure 3.4 shows the social optimal access price af with different market 
share of network 1 m and utility parameter a. We have the following observa-
tion. 
Observation 4 The social optimal access price of a network decreases in its 
rival network's market share. 
Observation 4 can be explained as follows. When an operator's market 
share (e.g., m of operator 1) increases, more customers are being connected 
to and more farther away users are being served. As a result, the average 
bandwidth cost of serving a user also increases. Due to the profit-maximzing 
nature of the network, it tends to increase the user pricing (ttQ significantly 
to compensate such cost increase (see Fig. 3.3). Though the social optimal 
user pricing increases as the market share of operator 1 increases, the profit-
maximizing user pricing increases more than the social optimal user pricing 
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for an increase in market share as observed in Fig. 3.3. Thus the access price 
charged by the other network (network 2) should decrease to provide incentive 
for the network to maintain serving at the social optimal user pricing. 
In fact, in the extreme case where the average cost has increased so much 
due to a very large market share, the access price from its rival network needs 
to be negative (i.e., network 2 pays to network 1 for using network 2，s resource, 
as the case of a — 0.8 and m = 0.6 in Fig. 3.4) to reach the social optimality. 
For example, assume that network 1 is a cellular network that has a large 
coverage area, a large market share, and an average of not very high channel 
condition to the users. Network 2 is a commercial Wi-Fi service provider that 
has a small coverage area, a small market share, and an average of excellent 
channel condition to the users. Then in order to maintain the social optimal 
user pricing, i.e., keeping the user price of the cellular network irl low enough, 
the Wi-Fi service provider needs to pay the cellular provider for a file transfer 
from a cellular user to a Wi-Fi user, as the cellular network is bearing most 
of the network costs in supporting the communication session. Notice that 
here we consider the case where the regulator determines the access pricing; it 
will be a quite different story if the networks themselves optimize the access 
pricing to maximize their profits. 
Observation 5 The social optimal access price increases in the elasticity of 
the users' utilities. 
We also note from Fig. 3.4 that the utility parameter a has a significant 
impact on the social optimal access pricing. A smaller a (e.g., a higher elas-
ticity) means a higher optimal access price (under the same market share). 
Since today's wireless networks are becoming more data-centric, we can ex-
pect that the overall users' utility functions (determined by the applications) 
will become more elastic and thus the optimal access price will become higher. 
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3.3 Deregulated User Pricing and Access Pric-
ing 
In the real world, very often, regulators do not always control the market. 
Instead, the market is deregulated most of the time. Operators have full control 
over the user prices and access prices. Only when undesirable outcome such as 
disputes and litigation (e.g., litigation between Telecom Corporation of New 
Zealand and Clear Communications in 1994) appears will then the regulator 
mitigates the situation. A deregulated scenario is similar to the scenario we 
described in the section 3.2 except that here we consider no regulators setting 
social optimal access prices. Similarly, we model this as a three-stage decision 
process as before such that operators determine their access prices at the first 
stage. Then, operators determine user prices charging their users at the second 
stage. Finally, each users determines his/her data rate demand based on the 
user pricing announced by the operator. Once again, we will analyse the 
problem by Backward Induction. We begin with Stage III. 
3.3.1 User's Optimal Data Rate Demand in Stage III 
Assuming the user pricing and access pricing is fixed at Stage I and II，the 
optimal data rate demand by an operator fs subscriber is given as 兀广,". 
3.3.2 Operators' User Pricing in Stage II 
Assume the operators already fix their access prices at the first stage, they 
will then determine the best response user prices at the second stage with the 
access price being fixed in Stage I. With the same profits formulated in the 
previous section, the best response user price would be given the same as in 
Proposition 2, i.e.: 
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兀 = 、 3 . 4 
m ( l — a ) 
and 
An、_ 一 m) + (1 _ - m ) + a^B\m) , � 
兀2 � = ( l - m ) ( l - a ) . 网 
3.3.3 Operators' Access Pricing in Stage I 
By the best response user prices formulated in Equation 3.4 and 3.5, we sub-
stitute them back to the profits Ri and R2 as defined in Section 3.2. Again, 
it is easy to check that Ri and R2 are quasi-concave in access pricing ai and 
(22. By applying first order condition, we could obtain the best response access 
prices a：* and <22* as: 
, - r r f ) + a ( l - - m * ) + ( l - r r f ) c i B ^ { r r f ) 
= ( l - m * ) ( l - a ) 5 ^ ( m * ) ( ) 
and 
* aci5" (m) + amciBd(m) + mcsJ^^l — m) 
以 2 = m{l-a)Bd{l-m) . 网 
We first look at the interaction between the profit maximizing access price 
that operator 1 has to pay to operator 2 with operator I's market share. As 
observed from Fig. 3.5, the higher the market share of operator 1, the larger 
the access price that operator 1 will have to pay to operator 2. This suggests 
that the increase in market share of a network not only increases the number 
of users and hence the total internal cost in serving the customers, but also 
the access price charged by the other network. 
Fig. 3.6 shows a plot of operator I's profit maximizing user price against 
her market share. We could observe that the user price increases as the cost 
Ci increases. Higher user price is needed as a compensation to an increase in 
service charge. 
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Figure 3.5: Plot of profit maximizing access price that operator 1 will pay to 
operator 2 against operator I's market share under different cost c：. 
Also, we can observe that the user price first increases with the market 
share and then decreases. As the cost Ci increases, the turning point at which 
user price changes from decreasing with market share to increasing with market 
share appear at a smaller market share. For example, at Ci = 1, the turning 
point appears at m = 0.6. At C2 = 2.5, the turning point appears at m = 0.5. 
This is because when the market share is relatively large, the increase in market 
share means the more users an operator has to serve. The new users are much 
further away and hence the average bandwidth cost per users increases. Also, 
the access price charged by the other operator increases as the market share 
increases. User prices increases as a result. 
When the market share is small, an increase in market share means that 
more users to be served. Even though the access price and average cost in 
serving a user increases, the increase in user price is offset by the fact that less 
access payment that needs to be paid to the other network. 
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Figure 3.6: Plot of Operator I's profit maximizing user price against the op-
erator's market share under different cost Ci. 
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Chapter 4 
Full Coverage Two Base 
Stations Model 
In this chapter, we consider a full coverage scenario that both operators provide 
full coverage. We first look at the regulated market and formulate the social 
welfare. We study the social optimal scenario under different costs. Then we 
look at the deregulated market and discuss the equilibrium scenario resulted. 
Finally, we will compare the social welfare and profits obtained compared to 
that in the fixed coverage market model. 
4.1 Full Coverage Wireless Market Model 
In real life, it is likely that base stations from both operators cover the entire 
area. Consider the cellular service nowadays. In many cases, signals from more 
than one networks could be received in the office or in the lecture room. In 
this case, it is the users' choice over which network providers to choose. It 
happens especially in a populated region such as the city of a country. We 
propose the full coverage market model to model this situation. 
Unlike to the fixed coverage model, each of the network covers all the users 
located in [0,1]. Initially, operators will send out pilot signals from their base-
stations telling users about the existence of the network service as mentioned 
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by [28] and [29]. The strength of the signal as received by users depends on 
the distance to the operator's base station and the power of the pilot signal. 
For a pilot signal sent out by an operator, the closer to the base-station of 
this operator, the stronger the pilot signal strength is. Operators set the 
strength of each of their pilot signal. For any possible pilot signal strength 
that each operators sets, the boundary user located at m, where m is between 
0,1], receives the same pilot signal from both operators. Hence, the users 
located between [0, m] will receive better pilot signal from operator 1 while 
users between [m, 1] will receive better pilot signal from operator 2. Note that 
users in [m, 1] could receive the pilot signal from operator 2 in this model. 
Prior to the users' transmission, each operators announces the user price 
that charges her end users via the control channel. Since each of the users 
could only be connected to either one of the networks, users will decide which 
operators to connect to based on the user price charged by each of the operators 
as well as the strength of the pilot signal received. This selection process is 
described in the next section. 
4.2 Users' choice of service providers 
For any user i, he/she will prefer operator j to operator —j if and only if: 
ri {Vij (TTj > n (TT—), 7T-j )， 
which happens when tvj < rr—j. Since the user price charged by an operator 
is the same for all users, all users will prefer network j to network —j when 
TTj < 7T_j. We assume the operators do have enough resources to serve the 
entire market. This could be ensured by buying enough spectrum together 
with the enhanced technology to improve the spectral efficiency. As a result, 
operators could handle the service demand even if it is from the entire market. 
On the other hand, a user will be indifferent between operator j and —j if 
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and only if: 
n {ylj (TTj )，TTj )=厂i {Vi-j i^-j),沉-j), 
which happens when ttj = n—j. In this case, the user will connect to the base 
station that with the strongest pilot signal strength as received by the user. 
This wireless operator selection method happens in everyday life. Consider 
the case where there are two WiFi services available. One of them charges and 
the other one is free. Users will choose the one that provides free access. If 
both services do not charge, users will connect to the one with the stronger 
pilot signal. 
4.3 Social Optimal User Pricing 
The users' choice of service providers suggests that there could be three possible 
cases: i) Operator 1 only (ii) Operator 1 and Operator 2 (iii) Operator 2 
only, the regulator could obtain the optimal social welfare. To a regulator, 
their concern is to maximize the overall social welfare regardless of monopoly 
market or both networks serving the market. By comparing the social welfare 
achieved in each of these three cases, the regulator could obtain the optimal 
social welfare. Note that in case (ii), in addition to fixing the user price at 
social optimal value, the regulator will have to fix the social optimal coverage 
which results in the highest social welfare. 
Case (i) - Operator 1 only 
Only operator 1 serving the market implies that user price of operator 1 is 
smaller than that of operator 2. In a fully regulated environment, this means 
regulator fixes operator I's user price at a social optimal level and that of 
operator 2 at any value above that of operator 1. The social optimal price of 
network 1 is the solution to the following optimization problem: 
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1-1/a 
max SW = ^ TTi—"a + CiB^l)) 
TTi 1 — a 
S.t. TTi > 7T2. 
It can be easily checked that the objective function is concave in tti. The 
social optimal user price in this case would be: 
TTi^  = + CiB\l); Trf < TTI 
Case (ii) - Operator 1 and Operator 2 
When both operators serving the users, the user prices must be the same. To 
realize such a case, operators would set the two user prices equal and at the 
same social optimal level. 
max SW = m— h (1 — m)— 
7ri,7r2 1 — a 1 — a 
- 7 T i - " ” (m, C i , C2) - 7T2-咖f (1 - m, C i , C 2 ) 
s.t. TTi =兀2. 
The function /(m, Ci,C2) has been defined previously in 3.1. The social 
optimal user price in this case would be given as: 
TTl^  = 7^2^ = f (m, Ci, C2) 4 - / ( 1 - m , C2, Ci) 
Case (iii) - Operator 2 only 
1-1/Q 
max TTs"'/" ic^B^{I) ^ c^B^l)) 
7r2 1 — a 
s.t. TTi > 兀2. 
After applying the first order condition, the social optimal user price in 
this case would be: 
t t / = C25"(1) + C2B\1)-7:I < Trf. 
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Figure 4.1: Plot of different resulted cases (i.e. only network 1 serving, or only 
network 2 serving, or both networks serving) under different cost Ci and C2 in 
the two base-stations full coverage model. 
4.3.1 Numerical study 
We will perform numerical study to find the market split between the operators 
that result in the optimal social welfare under different costs. Then we compare 
the social welfare between the fixed coverage wireless model and full coverage 
wireless model. 
Market split that result in optimal social welfare under different 
costs 
By comparing the social welfare obtained in these three cases, a regulator can 
figure out the optimal market share and how to regulate the market accord-
ingly. In other words, we will compare the social welfare obtained in case (i), 
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(iii) and the maximum social welfare that obtained in case (ii). 
Fig. 4.1 shows the resulted cases under different cost Ci and C2. It can be 
observed that when the cost of a network is significantly lower compared to 
the other one's, the market is better off to have only the lower-cost operator 
serving the customers. Most of the time, it is better to have set the situation 
such that both networks are serving. This is because in the case where the 
two per unit bandwidth cost are significantly different, the lower-cost operator 
can serve the market with a much lower cost even for customers further away 
from her base station. When the two per unit bandwidth costs are similar, 
each operators serve the users who are more efficiently and less costly served 
by her. 
Social welfare comparison between fixed coverage model and full 
coverage model 
Figure 4.2 shows the plot of Network l，s market share at fixed coverage that 
results in a better social welfare than the optimal social welfare in full coverage 
case under different cost Ci. The region bounded by the two lines are the region 
of interest. Note that in the full coverage case, there is only one optimal market 
share m that leads to the optimal social welfare and it is not shown in this 
figure. The figure compares the social welfare of different network I's coverage 
to the optimal social welfare obtained in the full coverage case. The optimal 
market share m in the full coverage is obtained by comparing the social welfare 
obtained in each of the market share [0,1 . 
It can be seen that having full coverage may not always lead to a better 
social welfare. It is because in full coverage case, the user prices are constrained 
to be the same, which may not be the best in terms of social optimality. 
By carefully designing the coverage in fixed coverage case, a higher social 
welfare could be obtained. However, the fixed coverage is constrained by the 
geographical factors and is not easy to change. In most of the time, full 
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Figure 4.2: Network I's market share which results in a better social welfare 
in fixed coverage case than in full coverage. The comparison is between the 
social welfare obtained in the fixed coverage to the optimal social welfare in 
the full coverage. The optimal market share in full coverage is not shown in 
the figure. 
coverage would lead to a social welfare improvement. 
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4.4 Deregulated case - Profit-maximizing ac-
cess price and user price 
In deregulated case under full coverage scenario, each operators has full control 
over access price, user price, and the strength of her pilot signal. Based on the 
user price announced by each operator and the received pilot signal strength, 
each user selects which operator to connect to and the demand rate from the 
network operator. At each cost Ci and C2, there is an equilibrium. There are 
three possible equilibria: 
1. < Users will all choose operator 1. 
2. Til > TV2- Users will all choose operator 2. 
3. T^l = TTg. Some users (i.e. users located within [0, m)) will choose op-
erator 1 and some (i.e. users located within [m, 1] will choose operator 
2. 
In case (1) and (2), the operator who announces a higher user price, say 
operator A, will have incentives to lower its user price to a value smaller than 
that of another operator, operator B, if she could by this mean capture the 
market and attain positive profit. Operator B will in turn set her user price 
smaller than the new user price set by operator A to attain positive profit and 
capture the market. The user price reduces until either one of the operator do 
not have incentive to further lower her user price. This happens when the user 
price sets the operator's profit to be zero. 
In case (1), the equilibrium user price will be slightly smaller than opera-
tor 2，s user price that results in zero profit (which means operator 2 has no 
incentive to further reduce its user price to gain non-positive profit). On the 
other hand, in case (2)，the equilibrium user price will be slightly smaller than 
the operator I's user price. Operator I's profit becomes zero in this case. 
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Case (3) could be an equilibrium since both operators are charging at the 
corresponding profit-maximizing user price. Any change in the user price will 
force one operator losing market while the other operator captures the whole 
market. 
The lower-cost operator has more control over the market split. If the 
lower cost operator sets her user price at her monopoly value, the higher cost 
operator cannot further under-cut her user price. The higher cost operator 
will lose market in the price-undercutting process described earlier in case (1) 
and (2). However, being the monopoly does not necessarily result in maximum 
profit. The lower-cost operator may gain better profit in case (3). As a result, 
she will compare the profits obtained in the duopoly case and in the monopoly 
case and decide which market split is the best in terms of her profit. 
Next, we will formulate the profits of each operator in each of the three 
equilibrium cases. From the profits formulated, we will study the access price 
and user price in each of the cases. 
Case (i) - Operator 1 Only 
Operator 1 will set the user price to at which operator 2 has no further incentive 
to undercut operator I's user price. In this case, operator I's profit becomes: 
兀 广 — TT严CiF^l) - TT严CiB卞). 
The monopoly user price of operator 2 that operator 2 has zero profit: 
TTs 
Operator 1 will set a user price that is smaller than this value, i.e.: = 
+ C2B^{1) — Si, where is small and determined by the individual 
operator. 
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stage I: Operators determine access prices charging each other 
\z 




stage III: Each end user determines which operator to connect to, and the 
data rate demand from his/her own operator 
Figure 4.3: Three-stage dynamic game in full coverage market model: the oper-
ators determine access price, then user price, and the strength of pilot signal; 
each users determines which operators to connect to and the corresponding 
data rate demand. 
Case (ii) - Operator 2 Only 
Similarly, operator 2 will set the user price to at which operator 1 has no 
further incentive to undercut operator 2's user price. In this case, operator 2，s 
profit becomes: 
兀2I —"a - 兀 严 C 2 B I I ) - 兀 严 � . 
The monopoly user price of operator 1 that she has zero profit: tti = 
Hence, Operator 2 will set a user price that is smaller than this value, i.e.: 
TTg = CiB^{l)-\-ciB^{l) — 62, where S2 is small and determined by the individual 
operator. 
Case (ii) - Operator 1 and Operator 2 
This could be modelled as a three stage game as in Fig. 4.3. The game setting 
is similar as in the fixed market model except operators could determine both 
the user prices and each one's coverage in Stage II and users will choose which 
operator to connect to and their corresponding data rate demand in Stage III. 
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Users' choice of operators and rate demand in Stage III 
In the equilibrium, the two user prices are equal and for the boundary set at 
m, users located within [0, m] will connect to operator 1 while users located 
within [m, 1] will connect to operator 2. 
Similar as before, an operator I's user will demand the data rate tt厂丄,". 
An operator 2，s user will demand data rate � 
Operator' User Pricing and pilot signal strength in Stage II 
The best response user prices would be the same as before and are dependent 
of the strength of the pilot signal in terms of m*. The best response user prices 
are given as: 
劣（ *� + m*ci5^(m*) + a2B^{l - m*) 
7ri(a2,m ) = — ^ , (4.1) 
m*(l - a) 
and 
*� - m*) + (1 - - m*) 
爪 ) = ( 1 - - * ) ( ! - - ) (4 2) 
aiB^jm*) . 
+ (1 —m*)(l —a). 
The access prices are assumed to be fixed at Stage 1. The pilot signals of each 
operator is set such that the boundary m is set such that m = m* where 
m* equates the two user prices. That is, m* is the solution to the following 
equation: 
CiBu(m*) + m*CiB^(m*) + asB 气 1 m*) 
饥* (A s) 
—C2BII - m*) + (1 - - m*) + aiB^jm*) � . ) 
= (1 - m*) • 
Operator，Access Pricing in Stage I 
The access price set at stage I is computed from the same objective function 
as in fixed coverage market model and hence is the same as before, i.e.: 
* — - m*) + a ( l - - m*)+( l -
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Figure 4.4: Equilibrium market split under different cost ci and c .^ The shaded 
region represents the duopoly scenario while the non-shaded area represent a 
monopoly scenario. This shows that when Ci and c^  are the same, the two 
operators serve the market together. 
and 
* — aci^^(m) + amci^^(m) + mcsJg气 1 - m) 
4.4.1 Numerical Study 
We will perform numerical study to investigate the equilibrium market split 
under different per unit bandwidth cost Ci and C2. 
Equilibrium market split 
Fig. 4.4 shows the equilibrium cases under different cost Ci and C2. It can 
be observed that when the two costs are relatively the same, the equilibrium 
would be when the two operators operating together and the user prices are 
the same. Otherwise, the operator with a lower per unit bandwidth cost could 
capture the market by setting a user price that is smaller than the user price 
that makes the other operator obtains zero profit. 
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Chapter 5 
Full Coverage Three Base 
Stations Model 
In this chapter, we consider a three base stations full coverage scenario that 
one of the operators set up a new base station. Similar as before, we first look 
at the regulated market and formulate the social optimal scenario. We study 
the social optimal market split under different costs. Then we look at the 
deregulated market and discuss the equilibrium scenario resulted. Finally, we 
will compare the social welfare and profits obtained in the three base stations 
full coverage market model compared to that in the two base stations full 
coverage market model. 
5.1 Three base-stations Full Coverage Market 
Model 
In practice, operators often have many base stations. Investing in building new 
base stations incur extra initial investment cost, but may be gaining benefits 
later on. For instance, the new base-station could be built in a region that 
could barely receive the service so as to fight for more subscribers. Also, the 
new base station could lower the average bandwidth cost per customers since 
some further away users could now be served by the closer new base station. 
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Figure 5.1: An illustration of the three base-stations market model. All base-
stations have full coverage. Each user connects to his/her preferred base-
station based on the user prices tti and 7T2 announced by the base-stations, 
and the received pilot signal strength. 
In this section, we consider a three base stations model at which one of the 
operators invest in setting up a new base station and place it at the opposite 
end. We consider operator 1 builds one more base station. The new base 
station is set up and co-located with the rival's base station at the location 
1 + eo. Fig. 5.1 shows an illustration of the three base-stations setting. 
We will compare the social welfare and profits obtained in the case of a two 
base stations against that in three base stations. To facilitate the comparison, 
we first of all analyse without considering the fixed cost incurred in building 
base stations. We will leave the analysis involving the cost of base stations as 
an extension to this work. 
The three base stations case is similar to the two base stations full coverage 
market model at which each users could choose their operators and data rate 
demand. If the user price tti is lower than tt�，all users prefer Operator 1 to 
Operator 2. Operator 1 will serve the users in an efficient way such that half 
of the users will be connected operator I's left hand side base station while 
another half of the users will be connected to operator 1 ’s right hand side base 
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station. Similarly, if the user price 1x2 is lower than tti, all users will choose 
operator 2. 
As before, only when the two user prices are equal will the users be indiffer-
ent between the two networks. In due case, both operators will be serving the 
customers. Operators will choose their best pilot signal strength such that user 
at the boundary m will be indifferent between the three base-stations. Users 
located at [0, m] will receive better pilot signal from operator I's left hand side 
base-station while Users located at [m, 1] will receive better pilot signal from 
the right hand side base-stations and are indifferent between operator 1 and 
operator 2. In this case, each of the users will have half probability of being 
served by operator 1 and half probability of being served by operator 2. 
5.2 Social Optimal User Prices 
There are three possible scenario as in the two base-stations market model - (i) 
Operator 1 Only (ii) Both Operator 1 and Operator 2 (iii) Operator 2 Only. 
We will formulate the social welfare in all these three cases. By comparing 
the social welfare in these three cases, regulator can obtain the optimal social 
welfare. We will formulate the social welfare obtained in each of these cases. 
Operator 1 Only 
When only operator 1 serving the whole market, the service load will be shared 
between the left and the right base-station. In other words, half of the users 
will be served by the left-hand-side base-station while another half of the users 
will be served by the right-hand-side base-station. The social welfare in this 
case equals: 
—兀 1 -1 " ( 2 c i B l � + ’ (5.1) 
I — a \ z 2 J 
while Trf is set at any value larger than 7rf 
48 
As a result, the social optimal user price Trf would be: 
Operator 1 and Operator 2 
To operator 1，the cost in realizing a session originated from user located di 
away from her left-hand-side base-station is the same as a session originated 
from user located di away from the right-hand-side base-station: 
( m 1—m \ 
1 岸 州 +2 J 
\ 0 0 / 
1—m 
+ f l � d r 
2 J gd(r) 
0 
To realizing a session originated from user i from di away from operator 2's 
base-station, operator 2 incurred a cost of: 
/ 1—m 1—m \ 
g乂(U) 2 J gd{r) 2 J 州 
\ 0 0 / 
/ rn \ 
+ 兀 [ 
,J a'^ir) \o / 
As a result, the social welfare when both operators are serving would be: 
观 丁 J t ^ + L 丁 J l ^ 
—TTi—i/"" (ciB^(m) + mciB^(m)) 
— 兀 ( 苦 炉 ( m ) + 苦 炉 ( 1 _ m)) 
, / 1 1 — 777 \ 
- 兀 � 5 ^ 1 5 1 1 — m) + — m ) j (5 2) 
- ( " a + 昨-m)) 
乂 4 4 ) 
—兀 2 - 1 / " 一 m ) + - m ) ) 
- ( " a - m) + 宁布)) 
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By maximizing social welfare subject to the constraint that the two user 
prices are the same, we obtain the social optimal prices to be: 
+ 专CiBd(m) + JC2B'(1 - m) 
+ -m) + - m) 
1-m , 1-m ,, � 
+ + - m) 
+ — m) + 一 m) 
Z 4 
1 — m ,, � 1 — m ,, � 
+ — - m) + — m) 
Operator 2 Only 
In this case, Trf is larger than Trf. The social welfare formulation is as same as 
in the two base-stations case. Hence, the social optimal user price Trf is given 
as: 
1 1 
= [ - ^ d r + 冬、dr., n! < ^ f . (5.4) 
J gHr) J 9^{r) ， 2 1 、 乂 
0 0 
5.2.1 Numerical Study 
We will perform numerical study to find the market split that results in the op-
timal social welfare under different costs. Then we compare the social welfare 
between the fixed coverage wireless model and full coverage wireless model. 
Market split results in optimal social welfare under different costs 
By computing and comparing the resulted social welfare in each of these cases, 
regulator knows which case result in a higher social welfare and hence set 
the user prices at the social optimal value. Fig 5.2 shows the resulted cases 
under different per unit bandwidth cost Ci and C2 in the three base-stations 
case. It can be noticed that when Ci is significantly larger than C2, the market is 
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Figure 5.2: Plot of different resulted cases (i.e. only network 1 serving, or only 
network 2 serving, or both networks serving) under different cost Ci and C2 
in three base-stations market model. Unlike to two base stations model, the 
market is not better off by only letting network 1 to serve as C2 increases. 
better off to have only network 2 serving. This observation is similar as before. 
However, this will be more easily triggered by an increase in cost Ci than in the 
two base-stations case. For example, if Ci = 8 and C2 = 2, the market is better 
off if only operator 2 serves under the three base stations case. However, in 
the two base stations case, the market is better off if operator 1 and operator 
2 co-exist. This is because in the three base stations market model, operator 
1 is serving more users than in two base stations case. An increase in operator 
I's cost increases operator I's service burden more in three base stations case. 
On the other hand, unlike to the two base stations scenario, the market is 
not better off by only letting network 1 to serve as C2 increases. For example, in 
two base stations case, the market will be better off by allowing only Operator 
1 to serve the market when Ci = 1 and C2 = 10. But in three base stations 
51 
7001 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 C) 14 I , , 1 1 
600 -\ 12 \ _ _ 
\ i�_\ _ 
500 - \ \ -
\ 2 g \ 
0) \ I \ ^^^^^ BS 
^ 400 - \ 1 ^ \ -I \ 广 V _ 
i - \ “ \ \ ； ^ B S 
\ 2- .•.•.•�•I�......^  
200 - \ 、 各 - 二 ： 二 -\ o' ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ ^ 
\ 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 
^ Cost C 
100 - \ -
q I I h . . . . . . 一 ~ — — — 竹 T 乐 . 「 丨 「 丨 . 丨 ④ © ^ 
0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 
Cost Ci 
Figure 5.3: Plot of social welfare in regulated case in the three base-stations 
market model and in the two base-stations market model. Three base-stations 
case results in a better social welfare when the cost Ci is low and worse than 
the two base-stations case when Ci gets larger. Note that C2 is fixed at 1 and 
the market is split between operator 1 and operator 2 (i.e. not a monopoly 
case). 
case, the market is better off by allowing both operators to serve the market. 
This is because in three base-stations market model, operator 2 is serving less 
customers since some of the users are served by both base stations of operator 
1. The increase in C2 hence impact less on the service burden of operator 2. 
Comparison between the maximum social welfare obtained in two 
base stations market and three base stations market 
Figure 5.3 plots the highest possible social welfare obtained in the two base-
stations full coverage case and that in the three base-sttaions full coverage 
case. Note that the cost C\ varies while C2 is fixed at 1. 
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It could be observed that when the cost Ci is low, building one more base-
stations leads to a higher social welfare. On the other hand, when the cost Ci is 
large, building one more base-stations leads to a smaller social welfare. This is 
because running one more base-stations means the new base-stations serving 
some of customers who are previously from the other network, assuming both 
operators are servicing the customers. When network I's cost is small, this 
means that more customers are being served by a network operating at the 
lower cost. As a result, higher social welfare is obtained. If network I's cost 
is large, more customers are being served by the more costly network. This 
lowers the overall social welfare. 
5.3 Deregulated scenario 
In the deregulated scenario where each of the operators wants to control and 
maximize her own profit, operators set access prices, user prices and pilot 
signal strength. Similar as before, there could be three possible equilibrium: 
1. 7tI < 7T2' Users will all choose operator 1. 
2. ttJ >712- Users will all choose operator 2. 
3. 7tI — TT;. Some users (i.e. users located within [0, m)) will choose op-
erator 1 and some (i.e. users located within [m, 1] will choose operator 
2. 
We will look at the profit, user prices, access prices, boundary m set in 
each of the equilibrium. 
Operator 1 Only 
Operator 1 will set the user price smaller than the smallest user price that 
operator 2 can accept for a non-negative profit. Such user price is such that 
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operator 2 has zero profit, i.e. C2召"（1) + C2B^{1). The profit that operator 1 
will get is: 
巧 1—"a - ‘ 「 1 〜 - ‘ 1 — ( “ (5.5) 
Operator 2 Only 
Operator 2 will set the user price smaller than the user price that operator 2 
receives zero profit, i.e. + - c i 召 T h e profit that operator 2 will 
get is as in the two base stations case, i.e.: 
Operator 1 and operator 2 
Again, we will analyse the problem by a three-stage Stackelberg game. As 
before, we will firstly compute the best response access prices, pilot signal 
strength in terms of m and user prices. 
The profit of network 1 made from an intra-network traffic originated from 
the left-hand-side base-station would be the same as the intra-network traffic 
originated from the right-hand-side base-station and is given as: 
m 
1 1 1 1 丄厂 1 TTi « — CiTTi - — CiTTi - / 
0 
1—m 1—m 
1 f 1 , 1 1 /" 1 , 1 
—CiTTi"" / —j—-dr X aoTTi “ / ———dr x -
J 9' (r) 2 J gd (r) 2 
0 0 
For an inter-network traffic originated from network 2 and terminated at 
network I's left-hand-side base-station, the profit gained by operator 1 would 
be: m 
( � 1 - C l ) 兀 办 
0 
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For an inter-network traffic originated from network 2 and terminated at 
network 2's right-hand-side base-station, the profit gained by operator 2 would 
be: 
1 — m 
1 i f 1 
0 
As a result, the total profit of operator 1 is given as: 
T T i i - i - + - m ) ^ C i T F i - i 
V 2 y V 2 / 
— ( + ( i ^ ) — r.)) 
k \ V 乂 ) (5.6) 
- m) 
V 4 乂 
, � f fl-m\ / l + 3m\\ 1 � 
To operator 2, the profit made from an intra-network traffic is: 
1 — m 
1 1 1 1 L f 1 , 1 
� J gd [r) 2 
0 
( 1 — m m \ 
- 一 八 J 士 
\ 0 0 / 
The profit made from an inter-network traffic is: 
1 — m 
去 ( … - / 六 产 
0 
Combining these, the total profit of operator 2 would be: 
1 —肌 1-1 1 -ipun � 
-^tts - - -C27r2 ^B (1 - m) 
1 - m 1 .. 、1 
— - m)-
f 1 - m\ f l - m\ 1 , � 1 \ 
+ � m + - ^ J # — - m) 
By backward induction, we obtain the best-response user prices as: 
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c們m) + IcB-jl - m) 
兀 1 ( 爪 ， 〜 ） = ( 1 - a ) ( ’ ) ^ 
( 宇 ） + ( ^ ) c^B'jl - m) 
+ ( l - - ) m ( ) 
(1^) - m) 
( 1 - c o m ， 
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= 例 1 - — + y ， i - — ) 
1 ( 1 -
- m ) + E,(m)))a, (5.9) 
At stage 2, operators set their market share such that the two user prices 
are equal. That is: 
c們m) + — m) + (宇 ) 
( ^ ) CiB^jl -m) + ( ^ ) - m) 
V 2 / / r 1 Q\ 
—C2 - m) + 宇 - m ) ) 、 . 乂 
= 
( 宇 （ I 恥 - m ) 肩 m ) ) ) a i 
At stage 1, operators set their access prices in order to maximize her own 
profit. By applying first order condition, we obtain the best-response access 
prices to be: 
1 一 ( ( ^ (IBM-m) + B,(m))) (1 — a ) 十 ^ ^ 
and 
* — + IciB^jl - m*) + ( ^ ) CiB^jm*)) a 
( l i ^ ) Bd(l 一 m*)(l _ a) (1 — a) • 
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Figure 5.4: Plot of equilibrium market split in deregulated market against 
different C\ and C2 under three base stations full coverage market model. 
5.3.1 Numerical Study 
We will perform numerical study to investigate the equilibrium market split 
under different cost C\ and c^ - Then we compare the profit obtained by operator 
1 between two base stations model and three base station model under different 
cost ci while c) is fixed at 1. 
Equilibrium market split 
Fig. 5.4 shows the equilibrium cases under different Ci and C2. Comparing 
to Fig. 4.4, in the three base stations case, operator 1 captures the market 
in more combinations of Ci and C2. It is because the new base station built 
by operator 1 shares some of the service workload. The lowest user price of 
operator 1 that results in zero profits is lower than in the two base stations 
model. As a result, operator 1 is able to offer lower user price and remains in 
the market in more combinations of Ci and C2. 
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Operator I's profit 
Fig. 5.5 shows the plot of operator I's profit in 2 base stations scenario and 
3 base stations scenario under different cost Ci. Similar as before, the cost of 
operator 2 C2 is fixed at 1 and Ci increases. In both scenario, operator I's profit 
decreases as the operator's operating cost ci increases. Eventually, the profit 
approaches zero since operator 2 reduces its user price so much that operator 1 
no longer has an incentive to undercut its user price to compete for the market. 
Operator 1 leaves the market in these cases. 
In the 3 base stations scenario, operator I's profit is higher in the 3 base 
stations case than in the 2 base stations case. This is because the service load 
is shared between the left hand side base station and the right hand side base 
station in the 3 base stations scenario. 
Though operator 1 will eventually lose the market as its operating costs 
increases, it happens at a smaller cost Ci for 2 base stations scenario than for 3 
base stations scenario. The increase in per unit bandwidth cost Ci is mitigated 
by the fact that the service load is shared between the two base stations in the 
3 base stations scenario. As a result, operator 1 leaves market at a higher cost 
Ci. 
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Figure 5.5: Plot of operator I's profits against different cost ci in the 2 base 
stations full coverage case ('o' marker) and in the 3 base stations full coverage 
case ('x' marker). Cost of operator 2 remains fixed at 1. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions and Future Work 
Wireless network competition is a hot research area in wireless communica-
tion. The goal of the study is to understand how to allocate valuable wireless 
resources fairly. Most work in this area considers setting the right prices to 
achieve this goal. Approaches such as optimization, game theory, and auction 
theory have been applied in the study. The existing studies in wireless compe-
tition consider either the interaction between users and operators, or operator 
and operator, but not both. In this thesis, we fill in this gap by considering 
also the interconnection issue. 
The difficulty in analysing interconnection issues lies in the complex cost 
structure of wireless channel condition. Unlike to fixed-line network, resource 
demand (e.g., bandwidth demand) is different for different users' location due 
to different channel gains. A connection between a source-destination pair 
close to a base station would require less resource than a source-destination 
pair far away from a base station. Also, the complexity in the cost function 
hardens the interpretation of a closed-form solution. As a result, we performed 
numerical study instead. 
The focus of this thesis is to provide relevant suggestion to both regulator 
and profit-maximizing operators. We consider three real life scenarios and 
compare the social welfare in the regulated scenario and operator's profit in 
the deregulated scenario. Other than suggesting which scenario and under 
60 
which condition is the best to regulator or operator, we would also like to shed 
the light for future researchers by providing a general framework in analysing 
wireless competition in the future. 
The scenarios being considered are - fixed coverage at which user-network 
association is fixed (Chapter 3), full coverage at which each user choose his/her 
own operator (Chapter 4), and three base stations scenario at which a new 
base station is set up to provide services to users (Chapter 5). In each of 
these scenarios, we formulated the social welfare and each operator's profit. 
Then, we solved for the social optimal user pricing in regulated market, profit-
maximizing user pricing and access pricing in deregulated market. 
We are interested in comparing the social welfare in the regulated market 
and operator's profit in the deregulated market between the aforementioned 
scenarios. We compare the two metrics between fixed coverage model and full 
coverage model, and between 2 base stations full model and 3 base stations 
full model. We showed that social welfare and operator's profit is not always 
improved in the full coverage case. On the other hand, by building one more 
base station, the overall social welfare and the operator's profit are both im-
proved only when the operator's per bandwidth cost is lower compared to the 
rival networks. 
In this thesis, the model that we adopted is similar to the one used by [8 . 
Our results depend heavily on the total cost incurred by a network, which is 
affected by the users' distribution. A change in the assumption about uniform 
distribution of users might have impact on the results and that needs a further 
study. 
Also, the investment cost and fixed cost incurred in a base station is not 
considered in our model. In the three base stations market model, the in-
vestment cost could be one of the factors that determine if the investment 
is profitable. For a particular per bandwidth cost, there might be an upper 
bound over the investment cost such that the investment is profitable. 
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There are other related areas which might be interesting for the future 
research. One possibility is to consider network effects as well. Price discrim-
ination could happen such that intra-network traffic could be charged lower 
than the inter-network traffic. In this way, users are encouraged to stay in the 
same network. Operators will require less resources from its rival network and 
can better control the total cost incurred. 
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